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AFTER ANOTHER DECADE





ublic pension schemes that today are operated
in virtually all industrialised countries, also
defining the scope for any other sources of retire-
ment income, are of a dual origin. What is now
often referred to as the contrast between
Bismarckian vs. Beveridgean systems – the former
being the dominant form of public old-age provi-
sion in continental Europe, the latter prevailing in
Anglo-Saxon countries – effectively dates back to
the introduction of public pensions in Germany
(1889) and Denmark (1891).1 Over time, national
systems that were inspired by either of these dif-
fering approaches have developed numerous simi-
larities with respect to many details, or have been
augmented by additional tiers that are built on the
competing tradition, thus compromising any sim-
ple distinctions. In fact, European pension systems
nowadays show what the philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein, in a very different context, has
termed “family resemblance”, pointing to the fact
that a limited number of distinct features are com-
bined in a far greater number of permutations in
any of the existing institutions.
The question of whether or not there is a conver-
gence of actual pension arrangements across coun-
tries has been addressed repeatedly over the past
decades. Sometimes the intention of those who
investigated it was purely descriptive, sometimes
the inquiry was also driven by an interest in explor-
ing ways to further co-ordinate,or even harmonise,
public pension systems, for instance on an EU
level.During the last fifteen years or so,there have
been fresh rounds of major pension reforms in next
to all European countries. As the reforms enacted
are meant to address very similar problems, and
are largely built on a similar set of principles, the
question for convergence across countries may
again deserve some interest.
It would go beyond the scope of this article to
describe all the details of current pension systems
and the changes made in recent years.2 Yet, based
on a stylised description of what national pension
systems look like, and what the latest reforms were
about, we can shed some new light on an old con-
troversy. In the end, the answer to the question
raised here will once again be twofold.Yes, there is
a notable degree of convergence brought about by
recent amendments. But, considering the different
points of departure, national systems seem to con-
verge towards at least two differing models which
can still be described in terms of the ancient
Bismarck-Beveridge dichotomy.
Bismarck vs. Beveridge: a stylised description
Ideally – i.e., disregarding a host of complications
that enter the picture if we look at real-world pub-
lic pension schemes as they are actually run
decades after their inauguration – Bismarckian
systems of old-age provision are characterised by
the following features:
– Membership is compulsory mainly for depen-
dent workers, the systems often being “categor-
ical” in that separate branches are designated to
different categories of (e.g.,blue-collar vs white-
collar) employees or to different sectors of
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1 In other words,Beveridgean systems were introduced long before
Lord Beveridge wrote his famous report in 1944. In a sense, the
contrast between the two types of regimes becomes even sharper if
we acknowledge that they were invented almost simultaneously
and not with a 50-year interval in between.Also, the rough locali-
sation need not be adjusted in any way, as it is well-known that the
Anglo-Saxons lived on the Danish mainland before many of them
moved to Britain.
2 Recently, the Ifo Institute has completed a comparative survey
dealing with all the three pillars of typical systems of old-age pro-
vision in the EU-15, Switzerland, and the US, covering revenues,
benefits, and the taxation of all major branches (cf. Fenge et al.
2003). Much of the information provided in this study, which was
published as a book volume in German only, will now be fed into
the DICE database (see http://www.cesifo.de).employment (in agriculture, mining, the public
sector, etc.).
– Benefit entitlements are strongly linked to an
individual’s contributions, based on benefit for-
mulae which, to some extent, are modelled on
the principles of actuarial fairness that are a
necessary ingredient in any privately managed
pension plan operating in a competitive envi-
ronment.
– Considering the level of benefits accruing to
individuals with a life-time work record,systems
of this kind usually aim at a substantial replace-
ment rate,effectively providing a major share of
retirement income for most pensioners.
In contrast, Beveridgean pension systems typically
have the following characteristics:
– Membership is much more universal, often cov-
ering the total labour force or,as a limiting case,
all the residents of a given country.
– The link between contributions and benefits is
weak at best,the latter being basically a flat rate
that is reduced pro rata temporis in cases where
labour force participation (or the time of resi-
dence) falls short of a legally defined qualifica-
tion period.
– Even in cases of a full life-time work record,
benefits are largely intended to guarantee a cer-
tain minimum level of retirement income, while
second or third-pillar provisions play a major
role for maintaining earlier living standards at
old age.
The first of these characteristics, though less impor-
tant from a theoretical perspective, often turns out
to be a crucial aspect for the implementation of
pension reform.Applying a new set of rules to just
one, universal system is often much easier than
doing so to a categorical system with several
branches that differ slightly in their design.The sec-
ond and third features – actuarial fairness vs redis-
tribution and the (average) level of benefits – are
obviously important in both theory and practice.
As of today, a common feature of the two types of
pension systems is that they are now run primarily
on a pay-as-you-go basis, current benefits being
financed from current contributions. The observa-
tion is remarkable because this is merely a histori-
cal outcome, not a necessary prerequisite for how
public pension schemes should be managed. In
fact, many Bismarckian systems were initially
meant to be fully funded,thus completing the anal-
ogy to private-sector pension plans.3 In the context
of pure flat-rate pensions, on the other hand, fund-
ing benefits has never been thought to be com-
pletely appropriate.
It has already been mentioned that much of the
contrast between the two regimes is effectively
blurred when we turn to real-world pension
schemes and follow the paths they have taken over
time. For instance, most Bismarckian systems do
not really take into account the full life-time pro-
file of annual contributions when assessing individ-
ual benefits. Instead, reference periods range from
the entire working career between the ages of
15 and 65, over the “best” 35, 20, or 15 years of
employment, to just the last 5 years before retire-
ment. Also, minimum pension guarantees have
been introduced in many of these systems. At the
same time, many Beveridgean systems have been
augmented by “supplementary” schemes with
earnings-related benefits in line with the Bis-
marckian tradition. Over time, these second tiers
have often turned out to be the dominant branch
of public pensions for most of the individuals cov-
ered.The latter observation is particularly true for
all of the Nordic countries, while the UK has sus-
pended mandatory participation in the supplemen-
tary public pension scheme only a few years after it
was established.
Allowing for these and many other complications,
public pension schemes that follow a primarily
Bismarckian tradition can be found in Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, and Spain. Public pensions that are built
on the Beveridgean tradition exist in Ireland, the
Netherlands,and the UK.Public pensions which,in
one way or another, combine elements of both
types of arrangements are operated in Denmark,
Finland, France, Sweden4, Switzerland, and the US.
Recent reforms: the main trends
First of all, the classification that was just given
relates to the situation prior to the latest round of
pension reform which has taken place during the
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4 In order to avoid confusion,I should hasten to add that in Sweden
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last 10 to 15 years. We will now look at what hap-
pens to our rough distinction following more
recent changes.
A fundamental trend necessitating some kind of
pension reform in virtually all industrialised coun-
tries is a projected shift in the population structure,
with the ratio of elderly people over individuals at
working age sharply increasing.5 Demographic
ageing is already well under way,being expected to
reach its peak in about 30 to 50 years. In order to
deal with the problems involved with this trend in
an economically reasonable and socially accept-
able way, recent reforms taken around the world
are driven by one or more of the following four
major sub-tasks:
– Reducing,in general,the level of unfunded pen-
sion expenditure over time; this is done, for
instance, through unspecific changes in the ben-
efit formula which governs pensions at award,
implying a decrease of the replacement rate, or
through adjustments in the indexation mecha-
nism that is applied to pensions after award,
moving, say, from wage indexation to CPI
indexation.
– Expanding the portion of pension benefits that is
funded;this strategy can be followed either inside
the domain of public pensions – by establishing
“demographic buffer funds” for example – or in
terms of strengthening second and third-pillar
arrangements that are expected to compensate
for the reduction in unfunded public provisions.
– Promoting actuarial fairness in several dimen-
sions, which usually also amounts to reducing
average benefit entitlements. Issues that are rel-
evant here are the extension of reference peri-
ods for the assessment of earnings-related pen-
sions, the reduction of financial incentives to
retire early, or the introduction of stronger
means-testing with respect to redistributive
benefit components.
– Introducing or expanding a limited number of
non-contributory elements, in particular mini-
mum pension guarantees for low-wage earners
and child-related benefits for parents who dis-
continue labour force participation for a limited
period of time.
At first sight, measures of this type seemingly con-
tradict the common trend behind all other
approaches to reform.On the other hand,they may
be just what is called for in order to fix a new set of
problems – in particular, poverty at old age arising
from gaps in coverage – that only turn up when
public pension schemes are tightened in regard to
many other aspects.
Whatever route is actually taken in a given coun-
try,the majority of pension reforms enacted during
the last decade is merely incremental in nature,
leaving the system basically intact with respect to
its general design.If we restrict our attention to the
countries of the EU-15, Switzerland, and the US,
reforms with a limited scope that can be subsumed
under sub-tasks 1 to 3 have recently been enacted
in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.6
There are also remarkable examples of more fun-
damental reforms, but their number is very limited
and some of them date back to more than 10 to
15 years ago.
In fact, the 1983 reform of US Social Security,
drafting a considerable expansion of the Social
Security Trust Funds, is remarkable – but not real-
ly fundamental – because it was enacted so early.7
The introduction of an “opting-out” clause for the
UK State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme was
also made during the early 1980s; in this case, the
reform is clearly fundamental in that it kept the
UK public pension system very close to its pure
Beveridgean design, against a broad-based trend
that could be observed elsewhere at that time.
In the 1990s, two further countries in our sample –
Italy and Sweden – carried out what could be
called fundamental pension reform. Interestingly,
the direction of these reforms is very similar in
both cases. This time, however, the main effort is
spent on making a Bismarckian system (Italy, in
1995) and a mixed regime (Sweden, in 1998) much
more “Bismarckian” than even the German public
pension scheme. In fact, with their new systema
contributivo and the inkomstpension, the Italians
and the Swedish invented what is now called a
“notionally defined-contributions” scheme, as
opposed to a system with defined (levels of) bene-
5 The timing and strength of these trends are of course different
across countries, but the fundamental pattern is the same every-
where. For comparative work on how demographic change is pro-
jected to affect public pension schemes in industrialised countries
if current policies are pursued over the long term, see OECD
(2001a, chapter 4) and EU Economic Policy Committee (2001).
6 For a more detailed survey, see Fenge et al. (2003, section 1.4).
7 This first example of introducing of “demographic buffer funds”
has served as a model for similar reforms that meanwhile have
taken effect in Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.fits.8 In NDC-type arrangements,
benefits are strongly linked to
individual contributions in a way
that mimics a particular design of
privately managed pension plans
which has become more and
more wide-spread over the last
two decades. Applying parallel
approaches to the domain of pub-
lic pension schemes was not con-
ceived of until just a few years
ago. The new Swedish pension
scheme is also remarkable for its
premiereservsystem, which was
introduced in the course of the
1998 reform and became effective
in 2000. Meant to make up for
projected reductions in unfunded benefits derived
from the inkomstpension scheme, there is now an
additional scheme of mandatory savings that is locat-
ed, in a sense, at the interface between a public pen-
sion scheme and fully private provisions.9
If taken together, the reforms observed in our sam-
ple of countries indicate that, over the last decade,
there has been some convergence with respect to a
number of basic features of how public pension
schemes are operated: the share of funded pensions
has increased, the idea of actuarial fairness has
moved to the fore, and systems with defined contri-
butions – instead of a defined-benefits arrangement
– have become more wide-spread over the past few
years. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that the
systems converge to just one, uniform, model across
all the countries considered here.
Some convergence with respect to basic features
In a recent review, Lindbeck and Persson (2003)
take the three elements just mentioned – the
degree of funding, the degree of actuarial fairness,
and the choice between pensions based on defined
benefits or defined contributions – to be the most
important features when it comes to assessing the
potential gains from pension reform. Following
their line of reasoning,we can thus obtain a simple,
but very illustrative way, of comparing systems
across countries and of tracking the relevant
effects of changes that follow from recent reforms.
First of all, note that the features chosen here are
indeed important as they relate to the three main
dimensions of (re-)distribution that are affected by
the design of pension systems: they are all about dis-
tribution – or, to put it in an alternative perspective,
about risk allocation – on an inter-generational level
(funding), an intra-generational level (actuarial fair-
ness),and between those who provide and those who
buy insurance (defined benefits vs defined contribu-
tions). If we accept that in between the extremes of
fully funded vs pay-as-you-go pensions and of strict
actuarial fairness vs pure flat-rate arrangements,
there exists a continuum of possible solutions, these
two features effectively span a two-dimensional
space in which any existing pension system can be
located. In addition, any change in the design of a
system can be represented as a move inside the fund-
ing-fairness space. This is precisely what is done in
Figure 1, which is meant to illustrate the position of
public pension schemes for all the countries consid-
ered here, also covering moves that occurred during
the 1990s. The third dimension is captured by using
different symbols for (the majority of) defined-ben-
efits schemes and the (rare and rather recent cases
of) defined-contributions schemes.10
It should be noted that, in Figure 1, the position of
any single pension system is to an important
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8 See Palmer (2000) for a comprehensive description.
9 With their Særlige Pension scheme, the Danish adopted a similar
approach as of 2001. The option of subsidising voluntary private
savings that was chosen in Germany in the course of the 2001
reform is different with respect to a very important feature – com-
pulsory participation. During the first year after its introduction,
response has been very low.
10The fact that the space spanned by the dimensions “funding”and
“actuarial fairness” is not a true rectangle has already been dis-
cussed in Lindbeck an Persson (2003),who also suggested this kind
of representation.The trapezoid form is meant to indicate that true
actuarial fairness is much more easily accomplished in the context
of a fully-funded pension scheme.CESifo DICE Report 1/2003 15
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degree not based on quantitative measurement.
Rather, the positions given are relative – vis-à-vis
the other systems, that is – and neither the precise
location nor the distance between the different
symbols should be over-interpreted. Given that,
the figure nonetheless tells us something about the
diversity of public pension schemes and the direc-
tions of recent reforms. First, it is easy to re-estab-
lish the classification of Bismarckian (positions:
top-right), Beveridgean (top-left), and “mixed”
regimes (located somewhere in the middle of the
graph).Second,recent reforms have only moved in
two directions: towards higher funding (down-
wards) and increased actuarial fairness (to the
right). So these are the aspects in which recent
reforms clearly coincide.
Before we continue, we must note that viewing
public pension schemes and their reforms in isola-
tion does not offer a full picture of general trends
in the larger field of old-age provision. (In fact, the
observation that the lower half of Figure 1 is near-
ly empty should warn us that the picture obtained
so far is incomplete.) Public pensions are clearly
important for the overall design of national pen-
sion systems – even where they deliberately leave
considerable room for second and third-pillar
schemes. But we would obviously miss important
pieces of information regarding actual similarities
and differences between national systems of old-
age provision if our considerations stopped here.
Figure 2 is therefore based on the same logic as
that in Figure 1,now covering national pension sys-
tems as they are currently designed in total.
Unfortunately, comprehensive information regard-
ing the relative importance of the different pillars
and branches of national pension systems is often
lacking. We therefore use whatever kind of infor-
mation is available, for example that provided by
OECD (2001b) regarding the share of different
sources of income in a typical retiree’s budget, or
similar results derived by Eurostat (2000) to locate
each national pension system as a whole in terms
of rough “cross-pillar”averages.(In some cases not
covered in these studies, it must be admitted that
the final position is merely the outcome of an
informed guess.) In any case, the relative position
of each country as represented in the figure should
again be taken to be more important than the pre-
cise location on an absolute scale.
Generally speaking, the vast majority of occupa-
tional pension schemes, and certainly all kinds of
purely private provisions, are fully funded.11 Also,
actuarial fairness established in these schemes can
be expected to be rather high, even though it need
not exceed the levels that we attributed before to
the highest ranking public pension schemes. As a
consequence, the position of entire national pen-
sion systems should again be located to the “south-
east”of the one indicated for public pensions alone
in Figure 1 – the question is merely, how far away?
The distance cannot be very long in the case of
countries with Bismarckian public pension
schemes, due to their relatively high levels of pub-
lic pension benefits that call for only a limited
amount of occupational pensions and additional
private savings as a complement. In contrast, all
the countries with pure Beveridgean systems, and
some of those with a mixed regime, have radically
altered their position.In these cases,symbols move
quite a long way from the top-left corner to the
centre of the graph or even to a
position somewhere in the bot-
tom-right section, indicating that
the total portfolio of old-age
provisions in the respective
countries is funded to a much
greater extent and exhibits a
degree of actuarial fairness that
is certainly not lower than in
countries which follow the
Bismarckian tradition. Last but
Figure 2
11 The only major exception is the French
system of occupational pensions which is
administered in a semi-public fashion,with
participation being mandatory for all
employed individuals and benefits being
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.not least,we observe that defined-benefits schemes
are still the dominant standard in pure Bis-
marckian countries12, while components with
defined contributions have become very important
in quite a number of the other countries.
Persisting differences with respect to the
public–private mix
What does all this imply with respect to conver-
gence across countries in terms of the management
of public – and,hence,national – pension schemes?
In spite of the fact that a host of recent pension
reforms are following a similar pattern,public pen-
sions systems in Europe and other industrialised
countries are apparently far away from moving
towards a uniform design.The most important rea-
son is that the starting point of reforms is very dif-
ferent from country to country. Comparing Figures
1 and 2, we can easily see that the different pillars
of old-age protection are weighted differently from
country to country. Thus, the main source of het-
erogeneity among the national pension systems of
industrialised countries is ultimately dependent on
the different public-private mix that is inherent in
their overall design.
From the point of view of countries with a rela-
tively high level of public pension benefits,increas-
ing the degree of funding and/or establishing more
actuarial fairness in the total portfolio of old-age
provision may be an important option for reform.
However, considering the considerable amount of
problems involved in a full transition, switching
from generous systems with earnings-related pen-
sions to pure flat-rate benefits is certainly not a
type of reform that can be easily enacted.
Conversely, countries where public pensions are
confined to a much more limited role, providing
relatively low levels of (mainly flat-rate) benefits,
are not too likely to expand their public pension
schemes beyond what is needed for a decent mini-
mum pension guarantee.Thus, in a realistic assess-
ment there is no way of harmonizing the two
approaches, which still turn out to be strongly
influenced by the competing traditions of
Bismarck vs Beveridge, in a uniform framework.
The choice between public pension benefits that
aim at making a substantial contribution to the
maintenance of earlier living standards or, as an
alternative,of public pensions that are only expect-
ed to provide protection against poverty in old-age
cannot be easily rolled back, even if it is effective-
ly a choice that was taken long ago.
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